Abstract-For over 300 years, criminal courts have regarded sexual infidelity as sufficiently grave provocation as to provide a warrant, indeed a 'moral warrant', for reducing murder to manslaughter. While the warrant has spilled over into diminished responsibility defences, wounding, grievous bodily harm and attempted murder cases, it is provocation cases that have provided the precedents enshrining a defendant's impassioned homicidal sexual infidelity tale as excusatory. Periodically, judges and law reformers attempt to reign in provocation defences, most recently in England and Wales where provocation has been replaced by a loss of control defence that, most controversially, specifically excludes sexual infidelity as a trigger for loss of control. This paper reflects on this reform and its reception glossing Shakespeare's scathing critique of warrants for murder in Titus Andronicus.
Act), consists of three elements. First there must be a loss of self control. Second, the loss of control has a qualifying trigger. Third, a person of the defendant's sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self restraint and in the circumstances of the defendant might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to the defendant. The triggers for loss of control are first, if it was attributable to the defendant's fear of serious violence or second, to a thing done or said which constitutes circumstances of an extremely grave character and caused a defendant to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged. Most controversially, s.55(6)(c) expressly excludes sexual infidelity as a trigger for loss of self control, omitted from the list of things done or said that constitute 'extremely grave circumstances or that caused a defendant to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged'. 3 The culmination of a campaign led by the then Minister for Women and Equalities Harriet Harman, s.55(6)(c) addresses long-standing concerns raised by women's rights groups about the operation of partial defences to murder in femicide cases. She explained that for centuries the law has allowed men to escape a murder charge in domestic homicide cases by blaming the victim. Ending the provocation defence in cases of 'infidelity' is an important law change and will end the culture of excuses.
capacity as a law commissioner, Horder thought it 'fraught with difficulty' and worried about 'being "absolutist" in this area'. Describing the wording as 'bizarre', he questioned in what circumstances 'a thing "said" in itself' could be said to constitute sexual infidelity-'is that really what is being aimed at' or 'is what is really being got at here sexual jealousy and envy, not "infidelity"? If so, why not say so'? He suggested 'binning' the clause or, at the very least, 'rewording' it to say that in so far as a defendant was 'motivated by sexual jealousy or envy, these motivations are to be disregarded'. 6 Horder's concerns related to 'tweaking or reshaping the law a little', especially with a reform of 'as much fundamental importance as this one' that had been so 'controversial within the legal community and beyond'. 7 Controversial it certainly was, many vigorously condemning the whole idea of challenging the timehonoured cultural script that killing on the ground of known or suspected sexual infidelity merits law's compassion. Some were apoplectic about a proposal they felt had the potential for 'grave injustice'. Inasmuch as 'unfaithfulness by a supposedly committed sexual partner is liable to cause deep shock and hurt, and for some of them, quite likely to provoke explosive anger', it was 'outrageous' that a 'person' who loses self control and kills must now be convicted of manslaughter.
8
The enduring sympathy expressed in the courts, criminal law scholarship and society at large for impassioned killers, indicatively men who kill their current or former wives and women partners while in a jealous rage-inspired 'red mist' has preoccupied me for some time. 9 Challenging the continuing disavowal of the sexed asymmetry of the ancient right to passion embodied in provocation by infidelity;
addressing the normative questions raised by the conceit that a woman's infidelity is sufficiently grave provocation to provide a 'moral warrant' to reduce murder to manslaughter, these remain focal concerns. 10 How best to query the justice dispensed in 'red mist' cases? The following analysis, offered as a contribution to the that damning parody of 'sexual infidelity' as excuse for femicide that reduces the 'tragedy' of homicidal male jealousy to farce. In Titus Andronicus, Shakespeare offers something just as valuable-a parody of justification-via-precedent for retaliatory violence. The play's scathing gloss on the notion of moral warrants for murder, I
suggest, opens up an illuminating space for questioning the ethical basis and hence the justice of manslaughter verdicts in sexual infidelity homicides.
The Furore over the Exclusion of Sexual Infidelity as Trigger for Loss of control
If the exclusion of sexual infidelity as a trigger for loss of control is yet to receive any sustained consideration in criminal law scholarship, it did cause a great deal of consternation at the time, several eminent lawmen expressing their continuing support for this culturally and legally-inscribed excuse for homicidal violence against women.
In November 2008, the media reported the response of Lord Phillips, then the Lord Chief Justice to Harman's call for abolishing provocation defences in infidelity cases.
He felt 'uneasy' about a reform that he felt 'so diminishes the significance of sexual infidelity as expressly to exclude it from even the possibility of amounting to provocation'. No ministerial statement had persuaded him it was necessary for reforms to 'go that far'. Indeed, no change was needed because the current law did not let men 'off lightly'-it required provocation to be conduct that would cause a reasonable man to act as the defendant acted. Furthermore, if juries were declining to hold that infidelity meets that test, he could not understand why it should be suggested that they are 'stretching the law to its limits'. 12 Harman persisted:
This defence is our version of honour killings and we are going to outlaw it.
We have had the discussion, we have had the debate and we have decided and
are not going to bow to judicial protests…I am determined that women should understand that we won't brook any excuses for domestic violence…It is a terrible thing to lose a sister or a daughter, but to then have her killer blame her and say he is the victim of her infidelity is totally unacceptable. The relatives say 'he got away with murder' and they're right.
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The dispute continued in the parliamentary deliberations on the reform bill, shrillest objections to the sexual infidelity exemption being raised in the House of Lords where emotions ran very high over the idea of depriving men of the ancient right to plead provocation after killing an unfaithful wife. Objections were couched in scrupulously gender-neutral terms. According to Lord Neill of Bladen, a retired judge:
The most common thing one reads in the press in murder cases is that the wife or husband finds the other spouse in the sexual act, loses control, picks up a bread knife or whatever comes to hand and stabs and sometimes kills the other In response, Attorney-General Baroness Scotland reiterated the government's position that an 'important policy shift' was required-'in this day and age' it was no longer 'adequate to treat violence as a justified response to anger and we wish to raise the bar in relation to the partial defence in order to reflect this'. The provocation defence was 'too generous to those who kill in anger' and this, she said, was a 'deliberate and carefully considered shift in policy'-it was unacceptable today for 'a defendant who has killed an unfaithful partner to seek to blame the victim for what occurred'. 16 Lord Thomas of Gresford, a deputy high court judge was unconvinced.
What, he asked, was meant by 'sexual infidelity'? Did it mean 'only between married partners', or did it mean 'between a man and a woman, or a man and a man'? Looking 'back in history', he recalled that adultery was described as one of the four categories of adequate provocation in the law's foundational case. Lord Thomas did not 'want to go back to those days'; he did not want to 'go back to provocation'. But if the law was to be based on loss of self-control, 'how can we exclude the deepest feeling and passions, the breach of trust and breach of faithfulness, from our considerations?' 17 As for Harman's view that the provocation defence 'institutionalises the culture of excuses'-that was 'just nonsensical rhetoric in an area of law of great sensitivity'. The Law Commission on which Horder sat 13 years later came to endorse the notion of a 'moral warrant' in the form of a 'warranted excuse' for murder, reinstating it in precisely in the same kind of femicide cases that had once so troubled him. 30 In recommending the retention of provocation on the basis of a consideration of a selection of hypothetical cases, the Commission, perhaps distracted by a reference asking it to pay particular attention to homicides committed in the context of domestic violence, rather than in a broader domestic context, paid insufficient, indeed no discernible attention to the cases that had led to the establishment of the reference on partial defences to murder. The precipitating events leading to the review, the triggers, if you will, for the establishment of the inquiry into the operation of partial defences to murder were not the infrequent domestic violence cases, the so-called 'slow burn' cases usually associated with battered women killers, but rather 'red mist' femicides.
In December 2002, the Attorney General appealed against sentences considered unduly lenient in 3 femicide cases. 31 The sentences, all for manslaughter, ranged between three and half and seven years. In two of the cases defences of provocation and diminished responsibility were raised. Both were exit cases. In one, a man killed a woman who had left him, the court noting he had found this difficult to accept. He said he 'just boiled over' in a 'red haze' and choked her to death, saying 'Do me a favour and die'. She had, he said, provoked him by saying she had the children, he only had their photos. The jury acquitted him of murder. In the other case, that of the 'overworked' solicitor Les Humes, a plea of guilty to manslaughter on the basis of provocation was entered on condition that this plea was accepted by the prosecution. Humes, who knifed his wife to death in front of their 4 children, the eldest a 12-year old covered in blood as she rang 999, said he was 'in a red mist' at the time and had 'lost it totally'-'It's like they say, you can see a red mist, I was bellowing like a bull'. Maddie Humes was not only going to leave him for another man for whom she had 'big style' feelings, she insisted on telling Humes so. He received a 7-year sentence.
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The Court of Appeal declined to interfere in any of the sentences. It was unmoved even by argument that sentences were much longer in attempted murder cases, even domestic cases, than in cases of manslaughter by reason of provocation.
As the court explained this anomaly, 'certain assumptions' had to be made in the offender's favour in provocation cases, including the assumption that the loss of control was reasonable and that the circumstances were such as to make the loss of self control sufficiently excusable to reduce the gravity of the defendants offence from By the mid-19th century, judges were directing juries that ocular inspection of the act of infidelity was essential for a successful provocation plea:
...to take away the life of a woman, even your own wife because you suspect that she has been engaged in some illicit intrigue, would be murder; however strongly you may suspect it, it would most unquestionably be murder.
The judge stated this 'without the least shadow of doubt. We must not shut our eyes to the truth'-conceiving 'a jealousy of the woman' would not reduce the crime to manslaughter. 56 As for the man who cut his fiancée's throat when she broke off their engagement, viewing her as if she were an adulterous wife and stating he had as 'perfect a right to deal with her life as he had with any other property, the court saw this as a simple case of insanity. 57 As the judge told the jury, if his 'real motive' was jealousy or a desire for revenge, that would be murder. After all, these were 'the very passions which the law required men to control'. He added: 'what would be the consequences to society if men were to say to every woman who treated them in that way' that she should die, and carried out such view by cutting her throat?' The defendant's claim that he exercise 'the same power over a wife as he could lawfully exercise over a chattel' was 'the conclusion of a man who had arrived at results different from those generally arrived at and contrary to the laws of God and man'.
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By the late 19 th century, wife killers were convicted of murder if all that they had to rely on was an 'innocent suspicion'-'perfectly sane men often have a suspicion of their wives having committed adultery'-killing such a wife was 'a very common form of innocent suspicion', but a suspicion was no warrant for murder, especially when men admitted that they did so because their wives had threatened to leave them. 59 Juries, however, were often reluctant to bring in murder convictions in femicide cases, many making recommendations to mercy in cases where women wanted to leave a man. That, they thought, was 'great provocation'. 60 recommended to mercy, including one who shot his wife, believing she 'compelled' him to do it. 61 In one early 20 th century case, a man who suspected his wife of involvement with a sailor killed his five-year-old daughter saying 'I am glad she is dead; she can't be brought up a prostitute now…I did it to save my old woman from putting her in bed with other men'. The jury recommended him to mercy 'on account of the somewhat honourable motive he had of saving the little girl from a life of prostitution'. 62 A man who murdered his daughter because she refused to disclose his wife's whereabouts after their separation was also strongly recommended to mercy on account of the provocation 'laterally from his family', namely their refusal to help him find her.
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Then followed a spate of well-known provocation cases where appeal courts were invited to follow Rothwell, 64 an 1871 femicide case, one of many departure cases to come-she left because of his violence, he killed her for leaving him.
Blackburn J told the jury that 'there may be such heat of blood and provocation as to reduce the crime to manslaughter' but where there are 'no blows', there must be 'a provocation equal to blows; it must be at least as great as blows':
For instance, a man who discovers his wife in adultery and thereupon kills the adulterer, is only guilty of manslaughter. As a general rule, no provocation of words will reduce the crime of murder to that of manslaughter, but under special circumstances there may be such a provocation of words as will have that effect; for instance, if a husband suddenly hearing from his wife that she has committed adultery were thereupon to kill his wife, it might be manslaughter.
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The door was now open for a wife's allegedly sexually allusive words to count as sufficiently grave provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter, but early 20 thcentury courts were reluctant to extend the doctrine, refusing to extend it to cover cases of murdered fiancées and unmarried partners. of Palmer, 66 it was 'well established by law' that a husband killing a wife found in adultery was guilty of manslaughter, not murder and that had been extended in
Rothwell to a wife's sudden confession of adultery, a sudden confession being 'treated as equivalent to a discovery of the act itself'. But while it was a grave offence against the husband for the wife to commit adultery, there was no such offence when the woman was his fiancée or was co-habiting with him. 67 Moreover, as the Chief Justice said in a 1920 femicide case, 'no authority can be cited to support' the proposition that if a wife told her husband that she was going to commit adultery a manslaughter conviction was possible. That was 'not the law of England'-a wife's statement that she was 'going to live with another man, or that she was about to commit adultery'
would not amount to provocation so as to reduce the crime of killing from murder to manslaughter. Indeed, the authorities supported the 'contrary view'.
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As for the soldier convicted of murder in 1944 after loading a Bren gun and emptying it to into a woman who had dumped him for a sergeant, the court was scathing about his appeal: There was not a 'scintilla of evidence' that could or should have been left to the jury. Just because he was jealous?-'A man may conjure up a motive or reasons sufficient for himself to cause him to kill, but it does not follow that that provides evidence of provocation'. Furthermore, 'the mode of resentment must bear some relation to the alleged provocation. A Bren gun which fires bullets in quick succession is one thing, but a woman showing preference for a particular lover is another'. 69 In mid-20th century England, jealous men who killed such women could find no authority that such 'infidelity' was sufficiently grave to provide them with a moral warrant for murder. beyond ocular proof of adultery. The court was unanimous: a confession of adultery 'without more' was not sufficient provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. The judgment warrants a lengthy citation, recognising as it does the inherently sexed operation of the defence and the need to balance respect for human frailty (his) with a consideration of the sanctity of human life (hers). The Crown's argument that it would be most 'unfortunate' if returned soldiers were to believe that on a wife's confession of adultery 'there is something like a licence to kill' was persuasive. No 'special quality' attached to confessions of adultery-words, 'whether an insult or an admission of adultery, never constituted provocation'. 71 The defence countered with the prediction, accurate as it turned out, that in the future 'there will certainly be ordinary reasonable men in this country who will hear confessions of adultery from their wives and some of them will be so deprived of their self-control that they will kill them'. If the Crown's argument was accepted, these men will be 'bound to be convicted of murder'. 72 The court was unmoved. Delivering the unanimous judgment dismissing the appeal, Viscount Simon said 'confession of adultery, grievous as it is, cannot in itself justify the view that a reasonable man (or woman) would be so her, and neither, on hearing an admission of adultery from the other, can kill the other and then claim provocation.
Sexual Infidelity as motive for murder in 'Modern Times'
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In Viscount Simon's view the application of common law principles in such matters 'must to some extent be controlled by the evolution of society' and 'as society advances, it ought to call for a higher measure of self-control in all cases'. where a man killed his wife because she wished to end the marriage, telling him she was having an affair but had not tried to 'boast about it' or 'disparage' him. 82 That the 'disenchantment' arising from 'faithless conduct' is almost exclusively one way, that the 'existing authorities' providing the Court of Appeal with 'sufficient guidance' in matters of sentencing were all cases in which men had been convicted of manslaughter after killing departing women, was simply taken as read. 83 Anyone who still believes that sexual infidelity killings feature 'a wife or husband' finding the other spouse in flagrante delicate, losing control and stabbing them, or that a reform expressly excluding sexual infidelity as a trigger for loss of control is illogical, 'truly objectionable' and 'outstandingly obnoxious' needs to read the case law. case in which a husband tried to murder a wife who had initiated divorce proceedings by setting her alight. His 14-year sentence was reduced to 12 years' imprisonment by a reluctant Court of Appeal that felt 'constrained to follow authority' that a lesser sentence was appropriate. 88 So too did the court in Bedford, another case of a man attempting to murder his wife by setting her alight. While 'each member' of the court thought there was nothing wrong with the 12-year sentence, they felt bound 'in the light of the authorities' to reduce it to ten years' imprisonment.
Law's Logic in 'Domestic' Cases-Querying the Weight of Authority
89
Reviewing these cases in a 1995 non-domestic rape and attempted murder case, the Court of Appeal relived its sense of obligation, stating that 'the weight of authority' in domestic attempted murder cases had 'compelled' it to reduce sentence.
The court gave this explanation:
In our judgment, a distinction has to be drawn between cases in which there is a pre-existing relationship between the victim and the perpetrator of the offence and those in which there is no such relationship. Whether that is a logical distinction is not for us to say, but the authorities clearly show that in cases where such a relationship exists or has existed a somewhat lesser tariff is imposed.
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Coming face to face with the received notion that killing a partner or former partner was a lesser form of homicide, the court demurred-whether a relationship, even a pre-existing one, should lessen the tariff imposed was not for it to say. Not for it a bold statement such as that made by the Court of Appeal in 1980:
An assault by a man on his wife should not be brushed aside as due to emotional upsets or jealousy; wives are vulnerable people at the hands of violent husbands, and there is no reason why a man should not be punished in the same way for assaulting his wife as he would be for assaulting any other person.
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It went without saying that the authorities that late 20 th century courts felt so compelled to follow in domestic attempted murder cases were all cases of attempted femicide committed by jealous men, their 'infidelity' allegations code for a woman's desire to depart.
Finally, four recent appeals against sentences considered unduly lenient in cases where men attacked women, sometimes fatally, reveal divergent judicial views on infidelity's mitigating prowess today. In the first, a successful appeal against a lenient sentence for grievous bodily harm for a man who, suspecting his wife of infidelity, branded her with an iron, Hallett LJ observed that:
…if there is anyone in or outside the criminal justice system who still believes that infidelity can justify or mitigate violence of this kind, they are mistaken.
Whatever the hurt or anger that a betrayed partner feels, they must understand that they should not resort to violence. If they do, they do so not only at the peril of their victim but at their own peril.
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His sentence was increased from two and a half to five years. Compare that to the unsuccessful appeal in 2010 against a six-year sentence for a man convicted of grievous bodily harm against a woman who had left him, started another relationship and, he said, sexually taunted him. Hallett LJ's observation about infidelity not mitigating violence, the court said, had to be 'closely examined':
There is no justification for violence arising from infidelity. Unlawful violence is unlawful violence, but the observation in relation to mitigation was clearly confined to the kind of systematic torture deliberately inflicted on the victim her new boyfriend, the court found that the 'actual trigger' to his 'readiness to kill' was his discovery of his former partner's 'latest relationship'. In its view, this could be said to amount to 'an element of provocation' that will mitigate sentence. 99 A man learning of his former partner's latest relationship-that's the kind of 'sexual infidelity' that will continue to mitigate murder in the post-reform era. Furthermore, infidelity will still be relevant to a defence to murder notwithstanding the reforms designed to exclude it. As the Court of Appeal has made clear in the most recent spate of wife-killing cases-all three of which were exit cases-'infidelity' taking the form of a wife's departure from a marriage may properly be taken into consideration for the purposes of the partial defence of loss of control when such behaviour is integral to the facts as a whole. 
Reading Titus Andronicus
Once dismissed as a simple revenge drama, a gore-fest of retaliatory violence-Titus
Andronicus is now finding a place in the law and literature genre, critics recognising its use of excess and overkill to 'define the ethical' and, ultimately, justice. attached with petitions to the gods and even to the underworld, but he finds 'no justice 97 Ibid, at para 32. 98 Ibid, at para 33. 99 R v Rush [2008] Cr App R(S) 45 at para 26.
In this reading, one that follows Heather James' influential interpretation of Shakespeare as performing an Ovidian critique of Rome, Titus Andronicus condemns Titus' slavish adherence to precedent texts to authorise revenge. 112 Far from supporting Titus' hegemonic view of his killing of Lavinia as culturally warranted, the play is a parodic indictment of self-legitimating precedents for retaliatory violence, a damning critique of cultural texts that distinguish between 'good and bad killing' and, more generally, the use of 'elevating' discourses, legal or poetic, that legitimate violence and grant it meaning. 113 Read this way, it creates an interpretative space for re-examining the process by which violence, whatever form it takes, is legitimated. Take infidelity homicide cases for instance. Following Shakespeare in
Titus Andronicus, what demands re-examination in these cases is not only the twisting and perverting of the foundational precedent case requiring ocular proof of a woman's infidelity. It is also the extraordinary expansion of that still 'lively' warrant for murder to departure cases, thus overriding the best efforts of many 19 th and 20 th century judges to contain its liveliness. More than that, it is the foundational precedent, or pretext, itself which must be interrogated. Isn't it past time, Shakespeare might ask, 300 years after Mawgridge, to query the notion that a manslaughter conviction for a man who kills a woman he deems unfaithful is warranted by legal precedent? Isn't it well past time to imagine a future outside this preset story, this pre-text, of male possessory right?
Conclusion: Murder, Manslaughter, Justice?
For one theatre reviewer, 'the nightmarish spectacles' of retaliatory violence in Titus Andronicus are 'cathartic channels through which the spectator is at once horrified and compelled to think about justice'. 114 Does this brief history of the sexual infidelity case law compel us to do the same? The question of justice is raised only very occasionally in the judgments. 115 In Vinagre, for example, the Court of Appeal wondered whether, following the logic of medical evidence about 'Othello Syndrome', it was necessary, 'if justice was to be done', to determine whether there was evidence that the victim, the appellant's wife, had been unfaithful. If so, it was a 'straightforward case of a jealous husband'. If not, the 'Othello Syndrome' could be 'called in aid'. The concept did not appeal to the court, but as the trial judge had accepted the plea, the court felt obliged to consider its sentencing implications. It decided that whatever the appellant 'may have been suffering from at the time when he killed his wife', he was not likely to have a reoccurrence-(his wife being, specifically, dead now, no need for a relapse)-and as he was no longer suffering from 'the kind of mental imbalance' that would justify a life sentence, 'justice'
demanded that his sentence be reduced to seven years' imprisonment. 116 In Townsend, one of the domestic attempted murder cases that so troubled the Court of Appeal, the 'real question' was whether, 'bearing in mind the domestic nature of this offence, as contrasted with, for example, an armed robbery leading to the same result, it is possible to take a rather more merciful view than that taken by the trial judge?' The court decided, without any further explanation, that 'justice would be done in this case'-the one where it was thought the woman might never recover from her shotgun wounds-if they reduced his fifteen year sentence by five years. 
